Let m < n be non-negative integers. An oracle chooses a permutation π of {0, 1} n uniformly at random. When queried with an n-bit string w, it truncates the last m bits of π(w), and returns the remaining first n − m bits. Such truncated random permutations were suggested by Hall et al., in 1998, as a construction of a Pseudo Random Function. They conjectured that the distinguishing advantage of this PRF, given a budget of q queries, Adv n,m (q), is small if q = o(2 (m+n)/2 ). They 
Introduction
Distinguishing a random permutation from a random function is a combinatorial problem which has a fundamental role in cryptology. Analyses of cryptographic primitives, such as block ciphers, hash and MAC schemes, often start with an idealization of the primitive as a uniform random permutation, in order to derive information theoretic security bounds. In this paper, we discuss a generalization of this problem.
We first recall several comcepts which are frequently used in cryptography. Let ℓ, n be positive integers and let F n,ℓ be the set of functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} ℓ . A Pseudo Random Function (PRF) Φ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} ℓ is a selection of a function from F n,ℓ , according to some probability distribution. The quality of a PRF Φ is determined by the ability of an "adversary" to distinguish an instance of Φ from a function chosen uniformly at random from F n,ℓ , in the following setting. It is assumed that the adversary has only query access to a function ϕ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} ℓ , which is either selected uniformly at random from F n,ℓ , or is an instance of the PRF Φ. The adversary may use any algorithm A that first selects (possibly adaptively) a sequence of queries to the functions, i.e. strings in {0, 1} n , and then, based on the answers to the queries, outputs a bit. We may interpret this bit as the guess of A. For b ∈ {0, 1}, let P A Φ (b) be the probability that the output is b when ϕ is our PRF, and let P A U (b) be the probability that the output is b when ϕ is selected from F n,ℓ uniformly at random. The advantage of A against the PRF Φ is defined as P A Φ (1) − P A U (1) (which also equals P A Φ (0) − P A U (0) ). The advantage, Adv Φ , of the adversary against the PRF Φ, is the maximal advantage of A against Φ over all the algorithms he may use, as a function of the number of queries. Hereafter, we consider adversaries with no computational limitations, in which case the advantage has an explicit expression which is presented in Section 2.
The permutation based PRF. A classical example of a PRF from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n is a permutation of {0, 1} n , chosen uniformly at random. In this case, the advantage of the PRF can be computed by means of the simple "collision test" and the Birthday Problem, and is
In particular, Adv(q) = 1 for q > 2 n . For q ≤ 2 n , the following approximations hold. Since for every 1 ≤ k ≤ q − 1 we have
Therefore,
This result implies that the number of queries required to distinguish a random permutation from a random function, with success probability significantly larger than, say, 1/2, is Θ(2 n/2 ).
A generalization of the above PRF is the following.
Definition 1 (Truncated Permutation PRF). Let TRUNC n,m : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n−m be defined by the mapping (x 1 , x 2 , . . . x n ) → (x 1 , x 2 , . . . x n−m ). The "Truncated permutation" PRF is the PRF defined by the composition TRUNC n,m • π, where π is a permutation of {0, 1} n , chosen uniformly at random.
Notation. The advantage of an (computationally unbounded) adversary against the Truncated Permutation PRF is denoted by Adv n,m .
The following problem arises naturally.
Problem 1. For every 0 ≤ m < n and q, find (the order of magnitude of ) Adv n,m (q).
A different, related, problem is the following. We proceed to describe the history of these problems.
The Birthday bound (folklore). We start by remarking that the classical "Birthday" bounds
and q 1/2 (n, m) = Ω(2 n/2 ) are obviously valid. In fact, any algorithm that the adversary can use with the truncated replies of (n − m) bits from π(w) (w ∈ {0, 1} n ) can also be used by the adversary who sees the full π(w) (he can ignore m bits and apply the same algorithm). Of course, we expect better bounds that would reflect the fact that the adversary receives less information when f (w) is truncated.
Hall et al. (1998) . Problems 1 and 2 were studied by Hall et al. [4] in 1998, where the truncated (random) permutation were proposed as a PRF construction. The authors declared the lower bound
for every 0 ≤ m < n and q ≤ 2 (n+m)/2 . This bound implies that q 1/2 (n, m) = O(2 (n+m)/2 ) for every 0 ≤ m < n. They also proved the following upper bound:
For m ≤ n/7 this implies that q 1/2 (n, m) = Ω(2 (m+n)/2 ). However, for larger values of m, the bound on q 1/2 (n, m) that is offered by (4) deteriorates, and becomes (already for m > n/4) worse than the trivial "Birthday" bound q 1/2 (n, m) = Ω(2 n/2 ). Hall et al. [4] conjectured that an adversary needs Ω(2 (n+m)/2 ) queries in order to get a non-negligible advantage, in the general case.
This settles Problem 2, but note that Problem 1 still remains quite open.
The best known bounds for Problem 1. Note that the bound (7) is tighter than the bounds (4), (5) and (6). Therefore, summarizing the above results, the best known upper bound for the advantage in Problem 1, is the one obtained by combining (2) and (7), namely
whereas the only general lower bound that we are aware of is the bound (3), declared in [4] . By (1), we know that the bound (9) is tight if m = 0, and it was shown in [3] that it is tight also in the case m = n − 1.
Our contribution. In this paper we answer Problem 1 by showing that (9) is tight for every q > 1, as formulated in the following theorem.
In particular, note that this implies that the bound (3) is, in general, not tight.
Notation and Preliminaries
We fix 0 ≤ m < n and q ≥ 1. Let D be the set of sequences (d α ) α∈{0,1} n−m of non-negative integers such that α∈{0,1} n−m d α = q and d α ≤ 2 m for every α ∈ {0, 1} n−m , and let:
We view Ω as the set of all possible sequences of replies that the adversary gets for hisueries. We remark here that in our problem, we may assume that all the queries are fixed and distinct (and hence q ≤ 2 n ). For every ω ∈ Ω let
For every positive α, let W (0, α) := 1 and for every positive integer k,
As in Section 1, consider an adversary that has only query access to a function ϕ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n−m , which is either selected uniformly at random from F n,n−m , or is TRUNC n,m •π, where π is a permutation of {0, 1} n , chosen uniformly at random. For every ω ∈ Ω, it easy to verify the following: the probability that ω is the actual sequence of replies that the adversary gets for his queries is 1/|Ω| in the former case, and R(ω)/|Ω| in the latter. Suppose that the adversary uses an algorithm A. Let S ⊆ Ω be the set of sequences of replies for which A outputs 1. Then
and the advantage of A against the PRF TRUNC n,m • π is therefore
Assuming the adversary has no computational limitations, we may conclude that
and
where all expectations, here and below, are with respect to the uniform distribution on Ω.
3 Some useful lemmas Lemma 1. For every positive α and positive integer k ≤ α,
Proof. Since ln(1 − x) ≤ −x for every 0 ≤ x < 1,
Proof. Let ϕ(x) := x + 2 ln(4/e)x 2 + ln(1 − x), then
and therefore ϕ increases from 0 to 1 − 1 4 ln(4/e) and then decreases. Since ϕ(0) = ϕ(1/2) = 0, it follows that for every 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2, ln(1 − x) = −x − 2 ln(4/e)x 2 + ϕ(x) ≥ −x − 2 ln(4/e)x 2 ≥ −x − x 2 .
Lemma 3. For every positive α and positive integer k ≤ α/2,
Proof. By Lemma 2,
Lemma 4. For every positive α and positive integer k ≤ α/2,
Therefore, using Lemma 2,
Lemma 5. Suppose q is a power of 2. Then for every
Then (d α ) α∈{0,1} n−m ∈ D and, since the function x → ln(1 − x) + x is strictly decreasing in [0, 1),
Therefore, if q ≥ 2 n−m then the maximum of F in D is attained at the sequence (d α ) α∈{0,1} n−m such that d α = q/2 n−m for every α ∈ {0, 1} n−m . If q < 2 n−m then the maximum of F in D is attained at any (d α ) α∈{0,1} n−m ∈ D for which d α ≤ 1 for every α ∈ {0, 1} n−m . Therefore, for every
Lemma 6. Suppose q is a power of 2. Then
We therefore assume that d α (ω) ≤ 2 m for every α ∈ {0, 1} n−m , and hence (d α (ω)) α∈{0,1} n−m ∈ D. Note that
If q < 2 n−m then by Lemma 5 and Lemma 3 we conclude that
If q ≥ 2 n−m then by Lemma 5 and a repetitive use of Lemma 4,
Proof. Denote p := 1/2 n−m and E := {{i, j} | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q}. Note that X = e∈E (X e − p) , where for every 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q, X {i,j} is the indicator function of the event {ω i = ω j }, whose probability is clearly p. Therefore, for every e ∈ E,
hence, by linearity of expectation,
For every e 1 , e 2 ∈ E, clearly
hence, using (12),
and, again by linearity of expectation, we get
For every e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ∈ E,
p 2 |{e 1 , e 2 , e 3 }| = 2 or |e 1 ∪ e 2 ∪ e 3 | = 3
hence, using (12) and (13), we conclude that 
the graph with edges e 1 , e 2 , e 3 forms a cycle (triangle) 0 otherwise, and, as before, we get
Finally, for every e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ∈ E, 
the graph with edges e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 forms a cycle (quadrilateral) 0 otherwise, and therefore
Proof. 
